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The Effect Of Auditor Designation  
On Audit Opinion: Evidence From Korea  





Korea introduced the auditor designation system as an exception to the free audit engagement 
system in 1991. The auditor designation system is a system in which Securities & Futures 
Commission designates an auditor for companies that are highly likely to manipulate their 
accounting information so as to conduct fair auditing. 
 
The meaning of this study is in that it focused on the auditor designation system, which is only 
enforced in Korea around the world, to investigate whether auditors of companies designated with 
an auditor express conservative opinions in comparison to companies without designation. This 
study also examined whether designated auditors give more conservative opinions to companies 
showing low quality of financial reporting. 
 
As a result of verification, companies designated with an auditor were found to have greater 
possibility of receiving adverse audit opinions compared to companies without designation, and 
lower quality of financial statements resulted in adverse audit opinions. Such results indicate that 
designated auditors perform stricter and more independent auditing. The results of this study can 
provide useful implications to other nations attempting to introduce the auditor designation 
system. 
 





s a product of social institution, accounting audit has undergone many changes as various 
institutional devices were enforced and supplemented to improve audit quality. Korea brought force 
an innovation in the method of auditor selection in 1982. The auditor assignment system enforced 
until 1981 was transformed into the free audit engagement system. The free audit engagement system gained 
persuasive power because of its advantage to reinforce expertise and competitiveness of auditors by efficiently 
distributing audit resources based on the market principles. However, the free audit engagement system was 
revealed to have a problem in securing independence of auditors. As a means to supplement this problem, Korea 
introduced the auditor designation system starting in January 1990.  
 
The auditor designation system is a system in which Securities & Futures Commission designates an 
auditor for companies that correspond to certain criteria regulated in ‘the Act on External Audit of Stock 
Companies’ for the purpose of accomplishing policy goal of protecting investors and creditors by providing reliable 
accounting information. Most of companies designated with an auditor are under surveillance sanction, have 
administrative issues, or are waiting for new listing. Companies designated with an auditor are characterized by 
violation of accounting standards, audit opinions that are adverse, and extremely low level of exposure of 
accounting information to the capital market. In addition, these companies have high uncertainty in persistence as 
going concerns, high risk of business failure, and high information risk with agent problem caused by information 
asymmetry.  
 
As such, since companies designated with an auditor fail to give trust to participants of the capital market 
about reliability of their accounting information, participants of the capital market will respond very sensitively to 
A 
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reliability of accounting information. Furthermore, it can be inferred that designated auditors would avoid audit risks 
and act more conservatively about future uncertainties based on their reinforced independence. Although managers 
and auditors sequentially participate in public announcement of accounting information, designated auditors will 
conduct audit more carefully and strictly compared to other auditors in order to increase reliability of financial 
statements, considering that financial statements are restated or audit opinions are formed based on mutual exchange 
of opinions in the auditing process. Due to such tendencies of designated auditors, they are probably more likely to 
express conservative audit opinions about companies being audited. Therefore, this study aims to verify whether 
companies designated with an auditor have greater possibility of receiving adverse audit opinions compared to 
companies without designation. Its additional contribution is in verification of whether designated auditors are more 
likely to express adverse audit opinions when quality of financial statements of is low, and whether reliability of 
accounting information pursued by the auditor designation system is achieved from the perspective of audit 
opinions. 
 
This study consists of the following. Chapter II introduces theoretical background, summarizes previous 
studies and sets forth the hypothesis of this study. Chapter III explains the process of selecting samples used for 
testing of the hypothesis and study model. Chapter IV explains the results of empirical analysis, and Chapter V 
summarizes the conclusions and contributions of this study.   
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND, LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Theoretical Background and Literature Review 
 
Korea has been adopting the assignment system in which the government forcibly assigned an auditor to 
companies subject to audit until 1981, but it was changed to the free audit engagement system allowing companies 
subject to audit to freely select their own auditor in 1982 with the enactment of ‘the Act on External Audit of Stock 
Companies’ in 1981. Whereas the free audit engagement system has an advantage of inducing systematization and 
enlargement of auditors and improving quality of audit service, there have been arguments that over-competition of 
auditors deduces independence of auditors and causes problem in reliability of financial statements announced by 
companies. Under such background, the auditor designation system was implemented on January 1, 1990 for the 
purpose of limiting a portion of auditor appointment right in companies and enhancing independence of auditors 
shown by the free audit engagement system. Appointment of auditors in Korea is generally done according to the 
principle of freedom of contract, but an external auditor is designated by Securities & Futures Commission for 
specific companies that are recognized to be in need of fair audit for protecting users of accounting information.  
 
This system allows for independent and fair external audit. Su-Yeong Kwon et al. (2004) used 
discretionary accruals in companies designated with an auditor from 1991 to 2000 to analyze whether auditor 
retention and auditor rotation of the auditor designation system improves independence of auditors. According to 
their study result, discretionary accruals were significantly lower for designated years of designated companies than 
undesignated years or undesignated companies. In addition, discretionary accruals of companies designated because 
of high audit risk were lower than discretionary accruals of companies designated because of low audit risk. This 
can be understood as provision of stricter audit quality by designated auditors. Se-Yong Lee et al. (2009) analyzed 
market response before and after designation of auditor using cumulative abnormal return on 179 companies 
designated with an auditor among companies listed in the securities market from 1994 to 2002. Also, long-term 
changes in market response to auditor designation were analyzed. As a result of analysis, CAR was founded have 
significantly positive (+) effect after the auditor designation date. This result suggests that designated auditors are 
positively received by market participants. Hyuk Shawn (2011) analyzed the effect of the auditor designation system 
on real earnings manipulation of companies listed in the securities market from 2001 to 2010. He reported that 
companies designated with an auditor have significantly lower REM than companies without designation, showing 




According to DeAngelo (1980), audit quality is defined as the possibility in which an auditor discovers a 
corruption or error in financial statements or possibility of honestly reporting a corruption or error found. In this 
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definition, the former is related to expertise of auditor and the latter is related to independence of auditor. In other 
words, audit quality can only improve reliability of financial statements when both expertise and independence of an 
auditor are satisfied. The auditor designation system was enforced with a policy intent to increase audit quality and 
increase reliability of accounting information by preventing weakening of independence of auditors by the free audit 
engagement system. Companies designated with an auditor are characterized by potential information risk, serious 
agency problem caused by information asymmetry, and high future uncertainty. Since designated auditors will 
generally show much more independent and risk-avoiding tendencies than auditors appointed by free audit 
engagement, they are likely to express strong opinions during announcement of accounting information. In addition, 
managers and auditors sequentially participate in preparation and auditing of financial statements in the 
announcement process of accounting information, but position of auditor takes dominance over position of manager 
in the auditing process.  
 
Previous studies report that designated auditors can increase audit time and demand audit fee in order to 
increase audit quality because of high audit risk (Jun-Hwa Noh et al. 2003; In-Tae Hwang and Seon-Min Kang 
2006) and show much stronger independence compared to auditors of free audit engagement companies as they 
secure dominant position in the audit contract (Su-Yeong Kwon et al. 2004; Hyuk Shawn 2011). Also, auditors take 
more audit time into companies with high litigation risk from business failure, and increased audit time according to 
litigation risk was found to reinforce conservative accounting on financial statements of companies being audited 
(DeFond and Subramanyam 1998; Cahan and Zhang 2006). Summarizing the results of previous studies explained 
above, companies designated with an auditor will have independent and risk-avoiding designated auditors who try to 
settle agency problem from information asymmetry and reduce audit risk from litigation by actively reflecting future 
uncertainties of companies on financial statements. Therefore, auditors are expected to apply stricter audit standards 
and express adverse audit opinions for companies designated with an auditor compared to companies without 
designation. Decreasing audit quality of companies designated with an auditor will result in stricter audit, which 
increases the likeliness to express adverse audit opinions. Hypotheses 1 and 2 have been set forth as below for such 
reasons. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Auditor-designated firms are more likely to receive adverse audit opinions than non-designated firms. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Lower quality of financial reporting by auditor-designated firms is more likely to receive adverse 
audit opinions. 
 
SELECTION OF SAMPLES AND STUDY METHODOLOGY 
 
Selection of Samples 
 
The sample for this research is based on firms all listed on both Korean Stock Exchange(KSE) and Korea 
Securities Dealers Automated Quotations(KOSDAQ) from 2002 to 2010, and following conditions are applied for 
sample selection and 13,429 firm-year samples were selected as final samples according to the conditions described 
above. 
 
Table 1. Compositions of Samples 
Sample selection process Num. of firms 
All firm observations from Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) and Korea Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotations (KOSDAQ) during the period 2002-2010Quotations (KOSDAQ) during the period 2002-2010 
16,344 
(Less) Financial service (1,269) 
(Less) Non-December Firms (513) 
(Less) Firms with insufficient financial data, audit opinion (1,133) 
Final Sample Size Used for H1, H2 
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Research Model 
 
This study attempts to verify whether auditors of companies designated with an auditor express 
conservative opinions in comparison to companies without designation. 
 
OPN, a dependent variable in the equation below, is a dummy variable that has a value of 1 when audit 
opinions are adverse and 0 when they are not. The interest variable of this study is DESIG dummy variable that 
stands for designation of auditor. DA1 variable was used as quality variable of financial statements in order to verify 
whether auditing becomes stricter due to quality of financial statements. If β1 shows statistically significant positive 
(+) value, it agrees with the hypothesis of this study that auditors are more likely to express adverse audit opinions 
for companies designated with an auditor.  
 
As for control variables, a dummy variable for BIG 4 accounting companies was included in the model to 
control the effect of audit quality on dependent variable. ROA, a variable for return on assets, was included in the 
model to control the effect of corporate performance on audit opinions. Since high cash flow ratio is likely to result 
in desirable audit opinions, SALES variable calculated by taking natural log of sales was included in the model to 
control CFO, cash flow ratio from sales activities, and corporate size. Moreover, ZSCORE variable showing 
bankruptcy risk of companies was included in the model because high bankruptcy risk is likely to result in 
inappropriate financial statements. Also, first-time auditors can provide strict audit opinions based on higher audit 
standards because they apply stricter judgment criteria to corruptions and errors reverted to the former auditors. On 
the contrary, there is a possibility in which they can express audit opinions based on lower audit standards as they 
reduce audit quality for running audit. As this is considered to affect audit opinions in one way or another, a dummy 
variable CHN that shows change in the auditor compared to previous year to control the effect of first-time auditors 
on audit opinions. GROWTH, a variable for growth in sales compared to previous term, was included in the model 
to control the effect of growth on audit opinions. Also, a dummy variable called MARKET that shows listing on 
KOSDAQ was added as companies that belong to KOSPI and companies of KOSDAQ can show collective 
differences. Lastly, year dummy and industry dummy were included in the model to control the effects of industry 
and year. 
  
                                                
1 We use performance matched discretionary accruals (Kothari et al. 2005) as a proxy for financial reporting quality. To estimate the performance 
matched accrual, we use following regression model. TAt/At-1 = β0 + β1 (1/Αt-1)+ β2 (ΔSALESt-ΔARt)/Αt-1+ β3 PPEt /Αt-1+ β4 ROAt/Αt-1 + εit where 
TA is net income minus cash flow from operating activities, A is total assets, ΔSALES is change in sales, ΔAR is change in account receivables, 
PPE is net property, plant and equipment, ROA is return on asset. The performance matched discretionary accruals is estimated cross-sectionally 
each year using all firm-year observations in the same industry as a residual form of equation above. 
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𝑂𝑃𝑁!,! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐷𝐸𝑆𝐼𝐺!,! + 𝛽!𝐵𝐼𝐺4!,! + 𝛽!𝑅𝑂𝐴!,! + 𝛽!𝐶𝐹𝑂!,! + 𝛽!𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆!,! + 𝛽!𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸!,! + 𝛽!𝐶𝐻𝑁!,! + 𝛽!𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻!,!+ 𝛽!𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇!,! + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝜖!,! 
 
OPN = 1 if audit opinion is non-unqualified, 0 otherwise 
DESIG = 1 if the company is designated with an auditor, 0 otherwise 
BIG4 = 1 if firm is audited by big4 auditor, 0 otherwise 
ROA = return on asset(= !"#$!!"#  !"#  !"#$%&!"#$!!"#  !"!#$  !""#$) 
CFO = (!"#$  !"#$  !"#$  !"#$%&'()  !"#$%$#$&'  !"  !"#  !"##$%&  !"#$!"!#$  !""#$  !"  !"#  !"##$%&  !"#$ ) 
SALES = ln(sales revenue) 
ZSCORE = company's likelihood of bankruptcy = 5.3693 − 19.860× !"#  !"#$%&!"#$!!"#  !"!#$  !""#$ + 4.9834× !"#$!!"#  !"#$"!"%&!"#$!!"#  !"!#$  !""#$ +0.6594× !"#$!!"#  !"##$%&  !""#$!"#$!!"#  !"##$%&  !"#$"!"%&   
CHN = 1 if auditor engages initial audit, 0 otherwise  
GROWTH = change in sales (sales!,! − sales!,!!!) 
MARKET = 1 if firm is listed on KOSDAQ, 0 otherwise 
YEAR = year dummies 




Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis 
 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the variables. Mean and median value of OPN are 0.006 and 0.00 
respectively. Mean and median value of DESIG is 0.036 and 0.00 respectively which implies 3.6% of firm-year 
samples were designated to be audited by specific auditor. And the mean(median) value of DA shows -0.008(0.009). 
<Table 3> shows the correlation among variables used in this study. First, DESIG agreed with the hypothesis by 
showing a significant positive (+) correlation at 1% significance level with OPN. As a result of examining the 
correlation among control variables, correlation between all control variables was less than 0.6 except the correlation 
between SALES and MARKET. And we found that VIF (Variation Inflation Factor) shows less than 10 implying 
that there is no multi-colinearity problem. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Median Maximum 
OPN 0.006 0.074 0 0 1 
DESIG 0.036 0.187 0 0 1 
DA -0.008 0.174 -0.871 0.009 0.423 
BIG4 0.143 0.35 0 0 1 
ROA -0.028 0.268 -1.684 0.033 0.306 
CFO 0.035 0.13 -0.483 0.044 0.348 
SALES 22.289 2.822 16.134 23.317 26.85 
ZSCORE -0.752 6.557 -7.861 -2.459 40.39 
CHN 0.165 0.371 0 0 1 
GROWTH 0.207 0.908 -0.919 0.078 9.001 
MARKET 0.609 0.488 0 1 1 
Variable definitions:  
OPN is 1 if audit opinion is non-unqualified, 0 otherwise,  
DESIG is 1 if the company is designated with an auditor, 0 otherwise, 
DA is performance matched discretionary accruals,  
BIG4 is 1 if firm is audited by big4 auditor, 0 otherwise,  
ROA is return on asset(=year-end net income/year-end total asset),  
CFO is cash flow from operating activities of the current term divided by total asset of the current term, 
SALES is ln(sales revenue),  
ZSCORE is company's likelihood of bankruptcy (=-5.3693-19.860×(net income/year-end total asset)+4.9834×(year-end liability/year-
end total asset)+0.6594×(year-end current asset/year-end current liability)), 
CHN is 1 if auditor engages initial audit, 0 otherwise,  
GROWTH is change in sales (=sales for the current period-sales in previous period),  
MARKET is 1 if firm is listed on KOSDAQ, 0 otherwise, 
 
Table 3. Pearson’s Correlation 
 DESIG DA BIG4 ROA CFO SALES ZSCORE CHN GROWTH MARKET 
OPN 0.066 -0.111 -0.023 -0.189 -0.111 -0.022 0.180 0.011 -0.008 0.005 (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.008) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0118) (<.0001) (0.1981) (0.3832) (0.5508) 
DESI  -0.080 -0.002 -0.163 -0.120 -0.032 0.162 0.200 0.018 0.003 
 (<.0001) (0.8116) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0002) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.041) (0.719) 
DA   0.014 0.695 -0.054 0.058 -0.621 -0.028 0.019 -0.003 
  (0.0697) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0002) (0.0137) (0.6993) 
BIG4    0.076 0.083 -0.036 -0.069 -0.024 0.001 -0.103 
   (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0017) (0.9021) (<.0001) 
ROA     0.569 0.031 -0.908 -0.017 0.092 -0.129 
    (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0227) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
CFO      0.084 -0.517 -0.010 0.068 -0.062 
     (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1919) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
SALES       -0.033 -0.032 0.089 0.881 
      (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
ZSCORE        0.012 -0.085 0.143 
       (0.1121) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
CHN         0.009 -0.030 
        (0.2371) (<.0001) 
GROWTH          0.070 
         (<.0001) Variable definitions: refer to Table 2. Values in parentheses are p-values. 
 
Multivariate Logistic Analysis 
 
Table 4 provides the results of logistic analysis tested out using OPN dummy variable as dependent 
variable in order to examine the effect of auditor designation on auditor opinion. Key variable is DESIG and if the 
sign of coefficient α1 is significant positive (+) value, it corresponds to hypothesis 1.  
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As a result of analysis, estimated value of  DESIG was 0.7874 (Wald χ²=4.1494). It has significantly 
positive (+) influence on dependent variable at 5% significance level. This result corresponds to hypothesis 1 of this 
study that designated auditor audited with caution client firm. Key variable is the interaction variable of UEOI, 
unexpected operating income rate, and NOE. As a result, the coefficient a1 is negatively significant at 10% 
significance. These result imply that firms with frequent shifting activity shows low accuracy on the analysts’ 
earnings forecasts. 
 
Table 4. Empirical Result (Hypothesis 1) 
Variables Estimate Wald Chi-Square 
Intercept -2.2087 0.9436 
Desig 0.7874 4.1494** 
Big4 -1.2297 6.1583** 
Roa -1.0143 2.0532 
CFO -3.1639 11.2215*** 
Sales -0.086 0.6414 
Zscore 0.0443 2.4907 
Chn -0.1484 0.2191 
Growth 0.0902 0.6519 
Market 0.0281 0.0018 
Year Dummies Included 
Industry Dummies Included 
Obs 13,429 
Pseudo 𝑅! 0.308 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
As a result of analysis, estimated value of DESIG was 0.7874 (Wald χ²=4.1494). It has significantly 
positive (+) influence on dependent variable at 5% significance level. This result corresponds to hypothesis 1 of this 
study that designated auditor audited with caution client firm. Key variable is the interaction variable of DA and 
DESIG. As a result, the coefficient a3 is positively significant at 5% significance level. This result implies that firms 
with worse financial reporting quality have a tendency to be audited more carefully by designated auditor. 
 
Table 5 is table that shows verification result for hypothesis 2, which predicts that designated auditors are 
more likely to apply stricter audit on companies with low quality of financial report. It suggests the result of logistic 
analysis performed using audit opinion as a dependent variable. If designated auditors apply stricter audit on 
companies with lower quality of financial report measured as DA as set forth in the hypothesis of this study, the 
coefficient of interactive variable of DESIG and DA will return a significant positive (+) value. 
 
Table 5. Empirical Result (Hypothesis 2) 
Variables Estimate Wald Chi-Square 
Intercept -2.2365 0.9711 
Desig 1.2376 8.9903*** 
DA -1.5258 1.8445 
Desig*DA 1.8185 4.2195** 
Big4 -1.2186 6.0053** 
Roa -0.1662 0.0269 
CFO -4.1054 10.7656*** 
Sales -0.0795 0.5534 
Zscore 0.0488 3.2433* 
Chn -0.1709 0.2969 
Growth 0.0704 0.3776 
Market 0.00012 0.0001 
Year Dummies Included 
Industry Dummies Included 
Obs 13,429 
Pseudo 𝑅! 0.317 
Notes: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
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The Effect of Types of Enforcement Actions on Audit Opinions (Additional Test) 
 
Enforcement actions are caused by various reasons such as companies with administrative issues 
(DESIG1), companies preparing for initial public offering (DESIG2), companies that have not appointed an auditor 
(DESIG3), companies selected for investment alert issues (DESIG4), and companies that requested enforcement 
action (DESIG5). As there are such diverse reasons for enforcement actions, this Chapter aims to specifically verify 
which reasons have negative effect on audit opinions.  
 
The results are as shown in <Table 6>. DESIGR1 for administrative issues and DESIGR4 for investment 
alert issues were found to have significant positive (+) effect on dependent variable OPN. The estimated value of 
DESIGR1 was 0.9514 (Wald χ²=4.162) implying that 5% significance level and the estimated value of DESIGR4 
was 3.191 (Wald χ²=8.5858) implying that 1% significance level. The results in <Table 6> support robustness of the 
study results as they agree with the basic hypothesis testing results of this study. 
 
Table 6. The Effect of Types of Enforcement Actions on Audit Opinions (Additional Test) 
Variables Estimate Wald Chi-Square 
Intercept -2.1891 0.9124 
DESIGR1 0.9514 4.162** 
DESIGR2 -11.2853 0.0001 
DESIGR3 -9.9233 0.0001 
DESIGR4 3.181 8.5858*** 
DESIGR5 -11.7437 0.0001 
DA -1.0428 0.8727 
Big4 -1.2096 5.9841** 
Roa -0.3347 0.1038 
CFO -3.879 9.2009*** 
Sales -0.0834 0.5949 
Zscore 0.0451 2.6065 
Chn -0.2204 0.4594 
Growth 0.0914 0.6606 
Market -0.0166 0.0006 
Year Dummies Included 
Industry Dummies Included 
Obs 13,429 
Pseudo 𝑅! 0.319 
Notes: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
Accounting audit is a social institutional device introduced as a means to settle agency problem and 
information risk caused by information asymmetry. Accordingly, the purpose of accounting audit is to improve 
reliability of financial statements for protection of users of accounting information and promotion of sound 
corporate development. It is important to maintain certain quality of accounting audit in order to play the intended 
role. The auditor designation system is a system in which an auditor is designated for companies that fall under 
prescribed criteria to achieve the policy goal of protecting investors and creditors through provision of reliable 
accounting information. Most of companies designated with an auditor are under surveillance sanction, have 
administrative issues, or are waiting for new listing. Companies designated with an auditor are characterized by 
violation of accounting standards, audit opinions that are adverse, and extremely low level of exposure of 
accounting information to the capital market. In addition, these companies have high uncertainty in persistence as 
going concerns, high risk of business failure, and high information risk with agent problem caused by information 
asymmetry. This study attempted to confirm whether reliability of accounting information intended by the auditor 
designation system is accomplished from the perspective of audit opinions by empirically verifying the effect of 
auditor designation on audit opinions. 
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As a result, companies designated with an auditor were more likely to receive adverse audit opinions 
compared to companies without designation, and lower quality of financial statements of companies designated with 
an auditor resulted in adverse audit opinions. Such results indicate that auditors perform stricter and more 
independent audit on companies designated with an auditor. Moreover, the result of additional test showed that 
companies designated with an auditor because of administrative issues and investment alert issues showed greater 
possibility of receiving adverse audit opinions than other companies. 
 
The results of this study offers useful implications to nations that plan to implement the auditor 
designation system by showing that auditors with increased independence under the auditor designation system 
perform stricter audit on designated companies, especially with greater possibility of expressing adverse audit 
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